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BOOK REVIEW

ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES: FEDERAL
LAW AND REGULATION. By Richard Littell. Washington, D.C., BNA
Books, 1992. Pp. 185. $72.00
Reviewed by E. Donald Shapiro*
Richard Littell's book, Endangered and Other Protected Species:
Federal Law and Regulation,' provides an informative survey of the
regulations that have been promulgated to protect endangered or
threatened species of flora or fauna. As such, it should have wide appeal
among lawyers working in environmental law as well as among
individuals dealing with protected species of plants or animals. Extensively
annotated, this book includes many valuable references to administrative
decisions not often found in the usual sources, making it extremely useful
for lawyers specializing in this area. Written in a style well-suited for a
layperson, the book also will interest those curious to understand how the
legal system affects conservation.
The book discusses many important pieces of federal legislation, in
particular the Endangered Species Act of 1973,2 as well as the effect of
various international agreements to which the United States is a party,
including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 3 The author's research also includes an
array of noteworthy administrative law decided by the Departments of
the enforcement of the
Interior and Commerce in connection with
4
Endangered Species Act and other statutes.
Initially, the book analyzes the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision
of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,5 a case that arose from the battle
@ Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Law Review.
* The Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor of Law at New York Law School
and Supernumerary Fellow of St. Cross College at Oxford University. The author wishes
to express his appreciation to his research assistant, Anthony Van Zwaren.
1. RICHARD LiTTELL, ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES: FEDERAL
LAW AND REGULATION (1992).

2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
3. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 6, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 244.
4. See LirTELL, supra note 1, at 77-93.
5. 437 U.S. 153, 154 (1978) (holding that the construction of the Tellico Dam and
Reservoir Project must be terminated under the Endangered Species Act because the dam
would eradicate an endangered species if constructed).
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to preserve the "notorious" snail darter. 6 Along with the equally

significant Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel,7 which addressed the
threatened existence of the spotted owl, this case demonstrates how the
government has attempted to achieve the often divergent goals of
conserving the nation's natural heritage on the one hand, and of promoting
economic growth on the other."
Although Littell possesses an obvious attachment to preserving the
natural order, he also recognizes the important need to promote economic
growth, a distinction that eludes many in the field. 9 He approves of cases,
for example, where the government has acted against unfortunate people

trying to protect livestock from the depredations of various endangered
species. Yet, at the same time, he is sympathetic to the use of controlled
trade to finance continued conservation, albeit through the sale of limited
numbers of protected species. 0

Conservation clashed with economic interests again in the important
case of Christy v. Hodel," involving a sheep farmer who shot and killed
one of the grizzly bears that had been decimating his herd. He pled a
defense of protecting property after being fined $2,500 as a civil
penalty. 12 Had the grizzly been listed as an endangered species rather
than merely a threatened species, the farmer could have faced criminal
penalties as well. 13 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused
to hear the property argument because it considered only self-defense or
defense of others as legitimate reasons for shooting protected wildlife. 14
6. See LrrrELL, supranote 1, at 3-6. See also Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549
F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1977) (reversing the district court's denial of an injunction
against continued construction of the Tellico Dam, which threatened the endangered snail
darter), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
7. 866 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Northwest Forest Resources
Council's economic interest in ensuring continued supplies of timber did not make it an
intervenor of right in an environmental group's action against the Bureau of Land
Management to prevent the sale of tracts of timber that threatened the existence of the
northern spotted owl), cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Forest Resource Council v.
Portland Audubon Soc'y, 492 U.S. 911 (1989).
8. See LrrrELL, supranote 1, at 4-5, 47.
9. Id. at 4-5.

10. Id. at 103.
11. 857 F.2d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Endangered Species Act
and the grizzly bear regulations did not deprive livestock owners of their property
without due process of law), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114
(1989).
12. Id. at 1329.
13. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b).
14. 857 F.2d at 1330.
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This decision ignored the fact that the farmer had used other, non-lethal
methods15 in attempting to drive off the bears before he resorted to
gunfire.

The ivory trade in Africa exemplifies how the economic needs of
developing nations can become subservient to efforts to preserve
species. 16 Although elephants neared extinction in the northern parts of
Africa, the species was so prevalent in the southern parts of the continent
that in Zimbabwe the government carried out a policy of culling 1,000
elephants a year to prevent overpopulation.17 The Southern African
nations urged the CITES committee to impose a partial ban, rather than
a complete one, because the funds gained from the sale of ivory were
needed by the tribespeople as well as to promote conservation of the
species." The international community, however, decided that a partial
ban would be too difficult to enforce and banned the culling process
completely.19 Littell points out that sometimes, in their zeal to protect
wildlife resources, conservationists overlook legitimate economic concerns
of indigenous peoples.'
Whether mens rea or strict liability should be applied to violations of
the Endangered Species Act presents another interesting legal question
discussed in the book.21 In United States v. Nguyen,' the court of
appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of a fishing boat
captain who killed an endangered species of sea turtle after the turtle had
become ensnared in his nets.' In reaching its conclusion, the Court of
Appeals was convinced that "Congress [had] deliberately dispensed with
a mens rea requirement for violations of that statute. " 2 Other
jurisdictions, however, have refused to interpret the Act as imposing strict
liability and have required a showing of mens rea.
15. L1rYELL, supra note 1, at 77.
16. Id. at 103.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 104.
19. Id. at 103.
20. Id. at 104.

21. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
22. 916 F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the government was not
required to prove that the defendant knew the sea turtle he caught was a threatened
species in order to convict the defendant).
23. Id. at 1017, 1020.
24. Id. at 1019-20.

25. See, e.g., United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988);
United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1487 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that
"knowingly" is an element of an offense of killing or taking an animal in violation of the
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The book extensively covers the Endangered Species Act and its
succeeding amendments. For instance, the Endangered Species Act
Amendments of 1982' were designed to thwart attempts by the Reagan
administration to hamstring environmental protection by having the

Secretary of the Interior weigh economic considerations in making
conservation decisions.' The Amendment guards against efforts to set
economic criteria for protecting species or their habitats.'
Littell also offers a broad examination of the Endangered Species

Act's "listing process"' and prosecutorial provision?0 The Act not only
requires the Secretary of the Interior to compile a list of plants and
animals to be protected, but also to assess the habitat that is necessary for
their survival. 3 The courts often have intervened to force the Secretary
to list species where denial of protection has been considered capricious

because of pressure from special interest groups. 2 This issue arose

during the controversy surrounding PortlandAudubon Society v. Hodel,33

where the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Secretary delayed listing
the northern spotted owl as imperiled because of the effect such a listing
would have on the lumber industry. The Ninth Circuit held that the delay
was arbitrary and capricious. In State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v.

Verity, a' the Fifth Circuit cautioned that a court "is not to weigh the

evidence in the record pro and con. .

.

. [I]f the agency considers the

factors and articulates a rational relationship between the facts found and
the choice made, its decision is not arbitrary or capricious." 3"

Endangered Species Act of 1973 but that only general intent is required, as opposed to
specific intent, to take a particular protected species).
26. Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311544).
27. See LrrrELL, supra note 1, at 12.
28. Id.
29. See Lrr"ELL,supra note 1, at 15-30; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c).
30. See LrrrELL, supra note 1, at 77-90; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)-(h).
31. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
32. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Portland Audubon Soc'y,
492 U.S. 911 (1989).
33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
34. 853 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that regulations imposed on the
shrimping industry in order to reduce sea turtle mortality did not violate equal-protection
guarantees and were not arbitrary and capricious).
35. Id. at 327.
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The Lacey Act,' another important federal law cited in this volume,
in effect extends federal protection to any species protected by state
regulations as well as by foreign governments. The state or foreign laws
and regulations, however, must be aimed at protecting the species
involved, not designed to collect revenue or to fulfill other non-protective
objectives.'
The book delves into other important federal regulations, including:
the Marine Mammal Protection Act,38 the Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle
Protection Acts,39 and the Migratory Bird Acts.' Littell gives fair and
full treatment to enforcement, litigation, and interpretation questions.
The reader will find that this book answers many questions relating
to how courts and federal administrative agencies have treated various
statutes. Littell has done an admirable job in presenting all of this
information without turning his book into a dry legal tome. He has
presented the material in an objective manner, but has not hesitated to
point out where, for example, the Reagan and Bush administrations bowed
to special-interest groups in order to subvert the intent of Congress in
passing many of these laws, especially the Endangered Species Act and the
Marine Mammal Protection Act.4 Similarly, Littell has not allowed his
interest in protecting these disappearing species of plants and animals to
cloud his vision of the need to promote economic expansion and account
for population growth.4'
By no means an environmental radical, Littell does not believe that all
economic development should be halted for the sake of an owl or a snail
darter. In fact, he claims that it is sometimes necessary to engage in
certain types of cultivation to preserve a species, as in Zimbabwe, with the
elephant herds, or in the Cayman Islands, where farmers raise sea turtles,
harvesting some and setting the rest free. This balanced approach gives
Littell a more authoritative and persuasive voice than the extremist experts
in the field. This book makes an invaluable reference source for anybody
interested in environmental law.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 667(e).
37. See United States v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217, 1218 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming the
district court's dismissal of counts based on alleged violations of Fiji revenue law that
was not covered by the Lacey Act, and reversing the district court's dismissal of counts
based on alleged violations of Papua New Guinea wildlife-protection law that was
covered by the Lacey Act).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.

39. 16 U.S.C. § 668.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712, 715-718.
41. See LTTrELL, supra note 1, at 12-13, 134-39.
42. Id. at xvh-xviii.

